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Introduction: What Is 
a Health Insurance 
Exchange?
In the national health care reform 
debate, President Obama has called for 
the establishment of a health insurance 
exchange, as has Senate Finance 
Committee Chairman Max Baucus. A 
health insurance exchange is a term 
to describe an organized marketplace 
for the purchase of health insurance.1 
In addition, a central feature of 
Massachusetts’s state health care reform 
has been the creation of a “connector” to 
organize the marketplace for individual 
and small-group health insurance. The 
Commonwealth Connector2 has also 
been used to make health insurance 
affordable, adequate, understandable, 
and available to everyone regardless 
of health status, and to promote 
competition. Organizing the health 
insurance market in this way makes it 
possible for residents to comply with the 
state’s new mandate that all adults have 
health insurance. 
Private health insurance markets today 
are not very organized. Individuals 
and employers voluntarily participate 
as purchasers, but too often those 
who would like to buy coverage face 
barriers to doing so, including problems 
of affordability and discrimination 
based on health status. Private health 
insurance companies and health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
must obtain a license to sell coverage 
but otherwise generally have autonomy 
in their business decisions to enter 
or exit a market, as well as significant 
latitude in their marketing practices 
and product design. Health insurance 
policies are highly variable, and some 
leave policyholders underinsured. Market 
rules and consumer protections also 
vary widely across states and products 
and often are confusing. As a result, 
consumers face difficulty weighing 
options and understanding how coverage 
works. Using exchanges to provide 
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The focus on national health care reform has given rise to 
a number of proposals for revamping the health insurance 
marketplace so that all Americans would have affordable 
coverage. One option supported by President Obama, 
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and other 
health policy leaders involves the government establishing  
a public health insurance exchange to effectively organize 
an insurance market for those without coverage.
Their theory is that a national health insurance exchange 
would provide coordination and guidance to insurance 
markets to help them comply with consumer protections 
and compete in cost-efficient ways that would result in 
more Americans obtaining coverage. 
Advocates of a public exchange say it could also help 
purchasers and insurers address some of the problems that 
currently exist in private health insurance markets, such as 
not enough risk spreading, discrimination, out of control 
costs, poor delivery of subsidies, troubles facilitating 
and ensuring enrollment, and underinsurance. These 
fundamental challenges have long hindered the efficacy 
of our nation’s health care system while contributing to 
the growing numbers of Americans who either have no 
insurance or insurance that is inadequate to meet their 
current and potential health care needs.    
In this paper, researchers from the Urban Institute review 
some of the key problems facing purchasers of insurance—
whether they be individuals or employers—and outline 
whether and how a public health insurance exchange might 
address them. The paper also highlights lessons that can be 
learned from the experience of prior efforts to create and 
operate exchanges, such as the Commonwealth Connector 
in Massachusetts. 
The authors conclude a well-designed exchange can help 
bring about changes that can move the system toward many 
of the nation’s most oft-stated health reform goals. Without 
an exchange, the authors assert that a patchwork of new 
agencies at the state and federal level—in addition to new 
roles for existing agencies—would be required to achieve 
similar reform objectives. 
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structure and oversight to these markets 
has, however, been met with some 
resistance from the insurance industry.3 
Key goals of health reform that expands 
coverage substantially and moves the 
nation toward universal coverage include
ending discrimination based on health •	
status and promoting sharing of 
health care risk,
slowing the rate of health care inflation,•	
subsidizing health insurance for low- •	
and modest-income Americans to 
make it affordable,
facilitating enrollment,•	
ensuring meaningful coverage, and•	
promoting transparency and •	
accountability.
A health insurance exchange can be 
designed to assist in accomplishing 
these goals, but exchange design 
choices are critical in determining 
their outcomes. This paper reviews 
key problems that face individual and 
employer purchasers today and ways 
a health insurance exchange might be 
designed to address these problems. 
It also highlights lessons that can be 
learned from the experience of prior 
efforts to create and operate exchanges.
The Role of an Exchange  
in Risk Spreading
An important factor determining 
how successfully an exchange can 
provide a more organized marketplace 
will be whether new regulatory 
reforms are also adopted to achieve 
greater spreading of health care risk. 
Competition in private health insurance 
markets today focuses largely on 
obtaining the lowest-risk enrollees. 
Research shows that the sickest 1 
percent of the population accounts 
for nearly a quarter of all health care 
spending and the top 10 percent 
accounts for two-thirds of health care 
spending, while the healthiest half 
of the population accounts for only 3 
percent of spending.4 Consequently, the 
financial gains to insurers able to enroll 
the best risks can be tremendous. 
Risk spreading evens out the cost 
of health insurance, using revenue 
collected from premiums paid by 
people when they are healthy to pay the 
claims of people when they are sick. 
In so doing, risk spreading makes the 
cost of coverage more predictable for 
everyone and makes medical bills more 
affordable for people when they are 
sick. However, because of the powerful 
financial incentives for insurers to 
segregate risks rather than spread them, 
when permitted by state law, insurers 
will refuse to sell coverage to those 
with high expected costs, charge them 
higher premiums, or permanently 
exclude coverage for their pre-existing 
health conditions. These behaviors are 
observed in most private non-group 
health insurance markets today.5 
Insurance market rules. Market 
regulations are required to prevent 
risk-selecting behavior by insurers. For 
example, guaranteed-issue requirements 
prohibit insurers from denying 
applicants based on health status or 
other risk characteristics; community-
rating rules prohibit insurers from 
charging higher premiums, at issue 
and at renewal, based on health status 
or claims experience. Similarity in the 
design of benefit packages is also critical 
to risk spreading, otherwise policies 
offering more coverage will attract 
consumers who need more health care, 
segregating the risk pool.6 
Currently states set rules to limit 
insurers’ ability to risk select, and state 
insurance departments implement 
these rules, with some minimum 
standards established in federal 
law. Under reform, more uniform 
requirements for guaranteed issue and 
modified community rating are likely. 
Implementation of new health insurance 
market regulations could continue to 
be the responsibility of state insurance 
departments, federal regulatory 
agencies, or a cooperative effort of state 
and federal regulators. However, in an 
organized marketplace, the exchange 
can play other key roles to reinforce 
market rules and risk spreading.
In particular, the exchange can penalize 
or exclude from participation companies 
that violate insurance market regulations. 
The exchange can also establish market 
conduct rules to prevent evasion of 
insurance regulations through sales 
tactics and other informal means. 
For example, it can offer or require 
enrollment through a centralized place to 
prevent carriers from redlining (denying 
coverage to specified occupations or 
communities) or “street underwriting” 
(informally assessing the risk status of 
applicants and actively marketing only 
to the healthiest) or otherwise failing 
to enroll sicker consumers. These 
kinds of functions are carried out today 
by the Commonwealth Connector in 
Massachusetts.7 
Even with market rules prohibiting 
risk selection, it is still possible for 
some insurers to end up with a 
disproportionate number of costly 
enrollees. Accordingly, another role 
for the exchange can be to provide for 
risk-adjustments to correct for uneven 
distribution of risks across health 
plans and ensure that health insurance 
premiums reflect the average cost of 
medical care as opposed to the mix of 
sick and healthy enrollees under any 
given plan. To date, policymakers have 
not been able to design very effective 
risk adjusters, in part due to lack of 
data about the relative cost of different 
health plan enrollees. However, the 
exchange could require insurers to 
provide such data and create more 
accurate risk adjusters. The more 
accurate the risk adjusters used, the 
greater the ability of an exchange to 
sustain a variety of insurance types, 
such as highly managed HMOs and less 
tightly managed preferred provider 
organizations (PPOs). Better risk 
adjusters would counteract criticism of 
past exchange experiences that they 
could not maintain such variety due to 
risk segmentation within them.8 
Exclusive vs. competing markets. 
A central question is whether the 
exchange is the exclusive marketplace 
for health insurance. If consumers have 
the option of buying health insurance 
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either inside or outside the exchange, 
opportunities for risk selection 
reemerge. Decades of experience 
with health insurance purchasing 
cooperatives, association health 
plans, and other competing pooling 
arrangements demonstrate that it is 
far easier for insurers to achieve lower 
premiums by avoiding high risks or 
attracting low risks than by achieving 
efficiencies in the sale of insurance or 
the delivery of care.9 
If the exchange is the exclusive 
marketplace for health insurance, 
opportunities for steering risks to 
alternative markets are eliminated. 
On the other hand, if insurers and 
purchasers can choose to participate in 
or outside the exchange, there will be a 
strong incentive to segregate risks. 
To the extent a residual market outside 
the exchange is contemplated, care 
must be taken to ensure that identical 
rules apply to health insurance plans 
regardless of where they are sold to 
avoid adverse consequences due to risk 
selection. Rules concerning guaranteed 
issue, guaranteed renewability, and 
community rating must be the same 
inside and outside the exchange. For 
example, in the past, health insurance 
purchasing cooperatives (HIPCs) 
established in Texas and Iowa were 
required to use community rating while 
insurers outside of the HIPC were 
allowed to vary rates due to health 
status. The HIPCs soon experienced 
adverse selection as higher-than-average 
risks had an economic incentive to 
join the cooperative, while lower-than-
average risks had an incentive to remain 
in the experience-rated traditional 
market, and HIPC rates soon became 
unaffordable.10 Comparable benefit 
packages must also be offered inside 
and outside the exchange; otherwise, 
sicker patients will gravitate toward 
the market where more comprehensive 
coverage is sold. 
If multiple marketplaces exist, 
enrollment and disenrollment must 
also be monitored carefully to detect 
patterns that indicate risks are being 
steered from one insurance market to 
another. Risk adjustments might also 
be needed to correct for selection bias 
of enrollment inside and outside the 
exchange. A state insurance department 
would ideally require similar data from 
non-exchange insurers that are required 
of exchange insurers to identify and 
address possible risk segmentations 
inside versus outside an exchange. 
Otherwise data on exchange enrollees 
could be compared with population 
averages as a proxy for measuring 
adverse selection into the exchange. 
The Role of an Exchange  
in Cost Containment
For a given population and level of 
benefits, two factors determine the 
cost of health insurance coverage of 
a given level of comprehensiveness: 
(1) the underlying cost of providing 
health care services (price per unit of 
service and the level and intensity of 
services provided to a group of a given 
risk level), and (2) the administrative 
(non-health care) costs associated with 
providing the coverage. 
Exchanges can attempt to lower the 
underlying cost of providing health care 
services by creating an environment 
more conducive to competition between 
health care plans, but such savings are 
theoretical at this point and dependent 
upon the design. 
Competition to reduce underlying 
costs of providing care. Provider 
payment rates under private insurance 
are significantly higher in the United 
States than in other industrialized 
nations.11 High provider payment rates 
may, in some instances, reflect high 
input costs (such as rent, cost of labor, 
benefits, etc.), but may also reflect a 
lack of competition in provider markets. 
For example, concentration in hospital 
markets has increased markedly since 
1990, largely in response to greater 
consolidation in insurance markets and 
the increased market power of insurers 
and managed care plans.12 There 
has also been an associated increase 
in alliances between hospital and 
physician groups. In addition, analyses 
suggest a high level of concentration 
in insurance markets has diminished 
competitive pressures and enabled 
insurers to increase profits while 
passing health care cost increases to 
consumers.13 The lack of competitive 
pressures leads to higher prices and less 
cost-efficient practice patterns.
An exchange could create more 
competition among health insurers if 
it were given the authority to negotiate 
with health insurers over premiums. 
Insurers could also be excluded from 
participating in an exchange based 
upon premium price or growth. State 
departments of insurance do not 
negotiate prices with insurers; this 
would be a new function that the 
exchange would serve. 
The exchange could also require 
all participating insurers to offer 
standardized or similar benefit packages, 
making it easier for consumers to 
compare prices for like policies. This 
would reinforce incentives for insurers 
to price premiums as competitively 
as possible. While standardization 
increases comparability of plans, 
increases risk sharing, and promotes 
greater competition, the tradeoff is that 
it reduces the number of insurance 
package choices available to consumers. 
Employers buying coverage through 
the exchange could also be required 
to make fixed contributions to their 
workers’ health insurance coverage 
regardless of plan chosen, providing 
them with an incentive to choose lower-
cost plans. By benchmarking premium 
subsidies in the exchange to lower-
priced plans (e.g., average of the lowest 
few bids, the median bid, etc.), enrollees 
would also have an incentive to choose 
lower-cost plans, and plans would have 
an incentive to keep premiums down in 
order to attract market share.
Providing a public plan option in the 
exchange could further enhance the 
competition among offerings.14 Such a 
public plan could be modeled after the 
traditional Medicare program and could 
pay providers based upon the evolving 
payments systems Medicare uses. 
Payment rates could be set at or above 
Medicare levels. Medicare payment 
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policies have been shown to reduce 
cost growth, especially for hospital 
and post-acute care services, relative to 
private insurers.15 Alternatively, a public 
plan might be modeled on self-funded 
health insurance plan options that most 
states today offer through their public 
employee health benefit programs. 
State personnel executives find such 
programs offer advantages, including 
the ability to develop new quality and 
cost-containment measures and realize 
long-term financial savings.16 A public 
plan with a potentially significant 
market share that controls provider 
payment rates could provide the 
competitive pressure to induce private 
insurers to be tougher negotiators with 
their own participating providers. The 
public plan might also be an innovator 
in the development of other cost-
containment mechanisms (effective 
disease management, health information 
technology, etc.), which could lead 
private plans to adopt such approaches 
as well, which could generate additional 
long-term savings. 
Reducing administrative costs of 
health insurance. Administrative costs 
of insurance are significant, yet not as 
influential on premiums as health care 
factors. According to the Congressional 
Budget Office, administrative costs of 
health insurance range from about 7 
percent of premiums for the largest 
employer groups to about 30 percent of 
premiums for the smallest groups and 
individuals.17 While exchanges have 
some potential for creating efficiencies, 
it is important to realize that an insurer’s 
administrative cost of covering 10,000 
people individually through an exchange 
will be higher than those of providing 
insurance to one employer with 10,000 
enrolled workers. The first case requires 
issuing 10,000 policies, whereas the 
latter requires only one policy. To the 
extent that health care reform shifts 
individuals from large group to individual 
policies, the system may experience 
some administrative cost increases. 
However, if the exchange primarily 
enrolls those who would otherwise have 
had small-group coverage or individual 
coverage, the difference in administrative 
costs might not be as significant. 
Exchanges could lead to administrative 
cost savings in several ways, 
however. First, a significant share of 
small-group and individual-policy 
administrative costs are attributable 
to marketing expenses. For example, 
commercial insurers typically pay agent 
commissions of 15 to 20 percent of the 
first year’s premium for newly issued 
individual market policies, and up to 10 
percent of the first year’s premium for 
small-group policies, with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield plans often paying lower 
commission rates.18 Sale of coverage 
through agents could continue under 
a health insurance exchange—small 
groups and individuals rely heavily 
upon agents for advice about coverage, 
and earlier attempts to organize 
markets through purchasing pools did 
not eliminate agent participation.19 
However, in a more organized health 
insurance marketplace with greater 
consumer protections and improved 
information materials, marketing 
costs could be reduced. For coverage 
sold through the Massachusetts 
Commonwealth Connector, for 
example, broker commissions range 
from approximately 1.3 to 3.3 percent of 
annual premiums, which is lower than 
they were prior to reform.20 
The exchange would also reduce 
administrative costs due to lower 
churning across insurance plans. 
Individuals who purchase their 
coverage through an exchange would 
not have to change insurance coverage 
when changing jobs. Employers could 
make their insurance contributions 
to the exchange, allowing workers 
to remain enrolled in a given plan 
regardless of their employment status. 
Currently, small employers in states 
without community rating have a 
tendency to change insurers when they 
receive substantial rate increases, also 
contributing to churning. Broad-based 
risk spreading within an exchange 
would drastically reduce year-to-
year variation in premiums and its 
consequent churning across insurers. 
Having a single exchange available for 
purchasers in a given geographic area 
will also serve to minimize churning, 
as individuals and employers would not 
be moving across markets in search 
of lower premiums—the competition 
would all be concentrated within the 
single exchange market. To the extent 
coverage is stabilized, insurers would 
have greater incentives to invest in 
benefits and services that can improve 
health and reduce costs in the long run. 
Churning blunts such incentives today 
because the benefits of health care 
investments in today’s enrollees may be 
realized by a different insurer.
Having a public plan option available 
in the exchange would provide a 
lower administrative cost option to 
enrollees and would likely pressure 
private plans to hold down their 
administrative expenses to remain 
competitive. Multiple studies conclude 
that administrative costs in public plans 
are lower than those in private plans.21 
One study, in particular, finds that 
public-program administrative costs, 
even after adjusting for the health care 
risk of the covered population, are 
lower than private-plan administrative 
costs.22 That study estimates that 
using a representative segment of the 
nonelderly population, a public plan’s 
administrative costs would be roughly 
6 to 8 percent, a significant savings 
compared with private plans. 
Finally, an exchange can require detailed 
reporting and disclosure of administrative 
costs by insurers. Transparency can 
reinforce competitive pressure to hold 
down administrative costs. 
The Role of an Exchange  
in Delivering Health 
Insurance Subsidies
The cost of delivering subsidies in 
a non-organized health insurance 
market can be substantial, depending 
upon the approach for doing so. For 
example, evidence from the Health 
Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) which 
pays non-means-tested premium 
subsidies for some 16,000 trade-
displaced workers indicates that roughly 
34 percent of total spending on that 
program is attributable to the costs 
of administering the subsidy.23 As a 
result of the many transactions that 
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are required to coordinate eligibility 
determination and to determine and 
make appropriate payments to hundreds 
of different health plans—processes 
that span multiple agencies under this 
program—the HCTC has proven to be a 
very expensive program for delivering 
health insurance premium subsidies. 
The administrative process has also had 
the undesired effect of making program 
enrollment difficult and time-consuming 
for potential enrollees, contributing to 
low participation rates. 
To administer subsidies, the exchange 
would need to collect information about 
individuals’ ability to pay, for example, 
from their most recent tax return and 
current pay stubs. Because a change in 
health insurance status tends to coincide 
with a significant change in income, the 
exchange would also need to provide 
ways for people to document or attest to 
recent changes in ability to pay. 
Centralizing the subsidy determination 
and the process by which subsidy 
payments are made to insurers into a 
single agency, such as an exchange, 
would be a much more efficient 
approach to administration compared 
to the HCTC experience. One-stop 
shopping streamlines the process 
for consumers. In Massachusetts, for 
example, residents fill out a single, 
common application for assistance; 
once their needs and ability to pay 
are evaluated, those qualifying for 
assistance are directed to Medicaid 
or to the subsidized private health 
insurance plans offered through the 
Connector, as appropriate. In addition, 
providing exchanges with the authority 
to standardize plans, limit the number 
of vendors, and reduce the number of 
transactions (e.g., by batching subsidy 
payments to carriers with less frequent 
reconciliations) would all serve to lower 
administrative costs and make the 
market function more effectively. 
The development of standardized 
products offered within the exchange 
can also be used as an efficient 
mechanism for subsidizing cost-sharing 
for the modest-income population. For 
example, a small number of plans with 
equivalent benefits but varying levels 
of cost sharing could be designed, 
similar to the approach taken with the 
Massachusetts CommonwealthCare 
program. People with the lowest 
incomes could be made eligible for 
subsidized coverage with the lowest 
level of cost sharing, those with 
somewhat higher incomes could be 
made eligible for subsidized coverage 
with somewhat higher cost sharing, 
etc. This approach allows for far less 
cumbersome administration of out-of-
pocket subsidies than reimbursement  
of cost sharing on a claim-by-claim basis.
The Role of an Exchange  
in Facilitating and  
Ensuring Enrollment
Creating an environment in which 
voluntary health insurance enrollment 
is made as easy as possible is a critical 
component of comprehensive reform. 
Health reform may provide for an 
individual mandate to obtain health 
insurance. Assuming such a mandate 
is implemented, if compliance with 
the law is made affordable and barrier-
free for individuals and families, then 
enforcement should be necessary for 
only a small share of the population. 
Even without an individual mandate, 
simplifying enrollment will be valuable 
in helping to promote higher coverage 
rates. An exchange could provide a central 
location for individuals and employers 
to obtain reliable information about 
coverage options, premiums, subsidies, 
and enrollment processes. It would 
also facilitate enrollment of individuals 
and firms if all related administrative 
tasks—choosing plans, determining 
subsidies, making payments—occurred 
at one locale with well-trained assistance 
available. Some have criticized exchanges 
as being duplicative of insurers in terms 
of administrative functions.24 While most 
exchange functions described here would 
constitute new roles that are not part of 
existing insurer activities, the enrollment 
area is one in which it will be important 
to carefully coordinate responsibilities 
in order to ensure that the most efficient 
entity performs specific tasks. 
In addition to enrollment, insurance 
retention is a very important issue 
in ensuring continuous coverage 
for the population. This issue has 
been highlighted in public insurance 
participation25 and is evidenced by the 
large number of insurance transitions in 
the private sector as well. On average, 2 
million people lose their coverage every 
month.26 Coverage may be lost due to 
job status changes, aging of dependents, 
divorce, etc. An exchange that tracks 
insurance enrollment and disenrollment 
and retains information on a variety of 
subsidized and unsubsidized insurance 
options can help individuals navigate 
these situational changes without 
experiencing gaps in insurance coverage. 
The Role of an Exchange 
in Ensuring Meaningful 
Coverage
Another key goal of health reform is to 
ensure that people have coverage that 
will actually pay their medical bills and 
secure them access to needed medical 
care. The exchange can promote this 
goal by ensuring that only policies that 
meet minimum coverage standards 
may be offered. In addition to ensuring 
coverage adequacy, minimum coverage 
standards will reinforce risk spreading. 
For example, if all policies must cover 
the same set of benefits, consumers will 
be less likely to gravitate toward policies 
based on their risk status. By contrast, 
for example, if only some policies in 
a market include prescription drug 
coverage, all other things equal, patients 
with expensive pharmaceutical needs, 
such as people with diabetes, multiple 
sclerosis, and cancer, will be more likely 
to cluster in those policies. 
Defining what constitutes “meaningful” 
coverage will inevitably entail 
controversy. The more health insurance 
covers, the more it costs. Political 
tradeoffs are likely. For example, 
minimum coverage standards in effect 
during the first year of health reform 
in Massachusetts permitted the sale 
of less expensive policies that did not 
cover prescription drugs, making it 
cheaper for residents to comply with the 
mandate to buy health insurance. Certain 
policies for young adults also capped 
covered benefits at $50,000 per year. 
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By the second year, minimum coverage 
standards were increased to include 
prescription drug coverage, although the 
“young adult” plans with benefits caps 
and no drug coverage are still allowed. 
Far less generous coverage standards are 
required by the state of Florida under a 
new program to make affordable health 
insurance policies available to all state 
residents. Some “CoverFlorida” policies 
do not cover any hospital or emergency 
room care, for example. 
An exchange might provide for a common 
set of services that all plans must cover, 
but permit some variation across policies 
based on the level of cost sharing (i.e., 
deductibles and copayments) that can be 
applied. Even greater variation might be 
applied through the use of benefit caps, 
as described above in the case of the 
Massachusetts reforms. Depending on 
what coverage standard is adopted, health 
reform may achieve universal coverage 
but problems of underinsurance may 
persist.27 A report on the Massachusetts 
health reform effort, for example, found 
the problem of underinsurance in that 
state, though diminished, has not yet been 
entirely resolved.28
Determination of what constitutes 
adequate coverage may be delegated 
to the exchange or some other 
independent body in order to remove 
this decision from the more political 
legislative arena and to permit 
modifications and updates. For example, 
one congressional proposal delegates 
to the Institute of Medicine the job 
of determining medically necessary 
benefits that all health insurance must 
cover.29 In Massachusetts, the legislature 
assigned to the Commonwealth 
Connector the task of designing 
minimum coverage standards for health 
insurance policies. The Connector 
established initial minimum creditable 
coverage (MCC) standards in 2007 and 
has updated them annually since. Under 
national reform, adequate coverage 
should be defined at the federal level, 
regardless if it is done by the exchange 
or another agency or organization.
In an organized marketplace, minimum 
health coverage standards must be 
enforced. The exchange can support 
enforcement by certifying that policies 
offered meet coverage standards. 
This task may be accomplished in 
cooperation with the state insurance 
department, which may review and 
certify policies. Such cooperation would 
allow enforcement beyond policies 
offered within the exchange. Additional 
minimum requirements for health plan 
provider networks, prompt claims 
payment standards, and appeal and 
grievance procedures, as well as other 
conditions of participation may also 
be required to ensure that promised 
coverage is delivered. Other entities may 
be involved in enforcement, as well. In 
Massachusetts, all residents must have 
coverage that meets MCC standards, 
regardless of whether they purchase 
through the Connector. Residents must 
file with their tax return certification 
of coverage under a plan that meets 
MCC standards, and the Department 
of Revenue assesses a penalty on those 
who do not comply.
Whatever standard for minimum coverage 
may be adopted, the exchange can 
monitor the impact of coverage standards. 
Measurements of uncompensated care, 
medical debt, and other indications of 
underinsurance can be developed and 
implemented, with findings reported 
periodically. The exchange may adjust 
minimum coverage standards in response 
to these measures.
The Role of an Exchange 
in Promoting Health 
Insurance Transparency
Transparency is critical in a competitive 
market where consumers have choices. 
If competition is to promote efficiency 
and cost savings, consumers must be 
able to distinguish plan features that 
affect costs, understand tradeoffs, and 
weigh choices in an informed manner. 
Currently, consumer information about 
health insurance can be quite limited. 
For example, consumers contemplating 
coverage choices typically only have 
health plan summaries available. 
The full policy contract usually is 
not delivered until after the policy 
is purchased. Important coverage 
features, such as the health plan 
provider network or the names of 
drugs covered under the health plan 
formulary, also may not be available to 
prospective enrollees. For medically 
underwritten policies—those for which 
premiums vary across enrollees as a 
function of their health status—the 
price of coverage also might not be 
apparent until the time of purchase. 
Even consumers who believe they are 
healthy may be surprised by premium 
surcharges imposed on the basis of 
relatively non-serious health conditions 
such as seasonal allergies.30 Premium 
increases at renewal may also be 
unexpectedly dramatic for consumers 
who make claims if they are covered 
under “experience rated” policies,31 or 
for consumers who remain covered for 
a number of years under “durational 
rated” policies.32 It can also be hard 
for consumers to know in advance 
whether a health insurance policy will 
pay claims promptly or provide good 
customer service.
One important task of the exchange 
is to provide more and better 
information about health insurance 
than consumers have available today. 
The Commonwealth Connector, for 
example, groups health insurance 
plans into three categories by actuarial 
value—gold, silver, and bronze—to 
make it easier for consumers to 
compare across options. In addition, 
the Connector web site and brochures 
make plan comparison documents 
available that highlight differences in 
key plan features such as deductibles, 
co-pays, and benefit limits.33 Detailed 
plan comparison documents are also 
prepared for participants in the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program,34 
California public employees and 
retirees,35 and senior citizens purchasing 
Medicare supplemental policies or 
HMOs,36 among others.
The exchange can delve deeper into 
health plan coverage features and offer 
information tools to help consumers 
determine which plan networks include 
their doctor or which plan formularies 
cover their prescription drugs. For 
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example, an on-line “formulary finder” 
allows seniors to identify which 
Medicare Part D plans cover their 
prescription drugs and what levels of 
cost sharing apply. This information is 
juxtaposed with monthly premium data 
so consumers can compare total costs 
they might face under different Part D 
plans.37 While an agency or agencies 
outside an exchange could play such 
a role, this is not common today and 
would require collection and processing 
of a great deal of information from 
insurance plans. Such a task would be 
easiest for a central clearinghouse, like 
an exchange, that is already interacting 
with plans, is familiar with plan 
details, and is involved with facilitating 
individuals’ enrollment in coverage. 
In addition to comprehensive and 
understandable plan benefit comparison 
tools, the exchange should also make 
available information about how 
different plans perform on measures 
such as prompt payment of claims, 
customer service, breadth and quality of 
plan provider networks, and outcomes 
of grievance and appeals processes. 
Information of this type would be 
particularly hard for consumers to 
gather on their own, and is available 
now in only a fragmented way for 
some plans in the form of consumer 
satisfaction surveys and health plan 
report cards.38 The exchange can also 
require disclosure of other important 
data by health plans and then verify, 
analyze, and publish findings to help 
consumers understand and evaluate 
differences in health plan performance. 
For example, in Washington State, the 
Office of the Insurance Commissioner 
(OIC) makes available a Health Carrier 
Information Comparison tool to give 
consumers information on the efficiency 
of health insurers. The tool provides 
information about carrier loss ratios,39 
profit margins and other characteristics 
to help consumers see how much of 
their premium dollars are spent on 
medical claims vs. administrative costs.40 
The New Jersey Insurance Department 
makes health insurance policy contract 
language available online.41 Organizing 
the health insurance marketplace so that 
these kinds of information are readily 
and routinely available to all consumers 
would be another important role of an 
exchange. To the extent coverage is sold 
outside of an exchange, state insurance 
departments might also play a role in 
collecting and summarizing information 
on non-exchange plans. However, 
implementing uniform information 
standards for all coverage across states 
would require federal involvement.
Beyond collecting data to help 
consumers make informed choices 
between insurance plans, an exchange 
could be responsible for collecting 
data to ensure that subsidy dollars are 
being spent on plans that are operating 
efficiently. This effort could include 
collecting key data on loss ratios, the 
health care risk profile of enrolled 
populations, and the use of health 
care services by enrollees. Such data 
could also be used for monitoring and 
enforcing federal standards, performing 
risk adjustment, and for developing a 
data base that could assist in designing 
system reforms that could increase the 
efficiency of service delivery. 
The Role of an Exchange 
in Promoting Health 
Insurance Accountability
Transparency in health insurance is 
also key to accountability. If a goal of 
health reform is to foster competition 
based on efficiency, one job of the 
exchange must be to gather information 
to ensure this is the case. It should 
be able to determine, for example, 
whether two low bids submitted by 
competing carriers reflect similar 
levels of efficiency or vastly different 
performance on prompt payment of 
claims. Transparency and disclosure 
of information to the exchange is 
necessary to 
monitor compliance with an •	
individual mandate by consumers, 
monitor compliance by insurers  •	
with market reforms,
contract with plans on the basis  •	
of efficiency, and 
determine the need for risk •	
adjustments.
Accomplishment of these goals will 
require disclosure of verifiable data on  
a variety of key factors, including
marketing and enrollment practices •	
by carriers, with detail by policy and 
by demographics and health status of 
applicants and enrollees;
enrollment and disenrollment •	
data, with detail by policy and by 
demographics and health status of 
enrollees and for people who renew 
or disenroll from coverage;
premiums charged when policies •	
are issued and renewed, with detail 
by policy and by demographics and 
health status of enrollees;
detail of benefits and cost sharing •	
under each policy;
information on provider participation •	
and fee schedules; 
loss ratio data, including detail  •	
on administrative costs by type  
of expense;
claims payment practices and history, •	
with detail for claims submitted, paid, 
delayed, and denied by patient type 
and type of service; and
data on diagnoses and use of services •	
for risk adjustment.
Through its transparency and disclosure 
requirements, an organized health 
insurance marketplace also will be 
much better able to verify compliance 
with rules that promote risk spreading. 
A coordinated effort with state 
departments of insurance would benefit 
those continuing to purchase coverage 
outside of an exchange.
Other Issues Regarding a 
Health Insurance Exchange
In considering the role and potential 
of a health insurance exchange, other 
important questions include who 
would buy coverage in an exchange, 
how would the exchange operate in 
relationship to existing agencies with 
jurisdiction over health insurance (in 
particular, state insurance departments) 
and who would operate an exchange—
the federal government or states? 
Answers to these questions will depend 
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 8
on broader health care reform policy 
and political decisions. 
Who participates? Under health care 
reform, it is possible that all private 
insurance would be purchased through 
an exchange. Alternatively, an exchange 
might be established to replace only 
those segments of today’s private health 
insurance markets that would benefit 
most from tighter organization. Larger 
exchanges might generate more political 
backlash from those who oppose new 
and bigger government agencies or 
from insurance companies and agents 
who might not favor the higher level 
of oversight an exchange could bring 
to the market. Arguably, the individual 
market and the group market for the 
smallest firms (for example, with fewer 
than 10 employees) experience the most 
difficulties today. The individual market 
is characterized by aggressive medical 
underwriting and risk segmentation, 
bare bones policies, and high rates 
of turnover. It is the market in which 
adverse selection concerns are the 
greatest. People buying on their own 
also lack assistance that might otherwise 
be provided by a human resources 
department. In the small-group market, 
the smallest firms are least likely to offer 
coverage today and tend to be more 
vulnerable to insurer underwriting 
and pricing practices designed to deter 
adverse selection. The smallest firms 
also tend to lack the resources to hire 
human resources experts.42 
If the exchange is limited to only 
individuals and small employers, a 
question arises as to whether employees 
of large firms would be eligible to seek 
subsidized coverage in the exchange. 
Such individuals might be allowed to 
obtain subsidized coverage through 
the exchange if that would make them 
better off relative to what their job-based 
health plan covers and costs. However, 
permitting this would also increase the 
cost of the subsidy program overall, 
displacing a greater amount of private 
spending. Alternatively, if a priority of 
reform is to enhance choice of plans, all 
individuals might be offered the option of 
obtaining coverage through the exchange, 
including employees who are also offered 
job-based coverage. As noted earlier, 
however, when individuals can choose to 
buy coverage in or out of the exchange, 
risk selection issues arise. At a minimum, 
risk selection would need to be closely 
monitored in such a context, and risk 
adjustments could be used to correct for 
significant selection problems.
How does an exchange relate to other 
agencies? Many key functions of an 
exchange are likely to be new, not 
now undertaken (or undertaken very 
extensively) by existing government 
agencies—for example, negotiating with 
health plans, establishing minimum 
coverage standards, subsidizing health 
insurance premiums, providing plan 
comparison tools, and facilitating 
enrollment. It seems unlikely that an 
exchange would also be designed to 
replicate or replace other functions 
now carried out by other agencies. 
In particular, an exchange probably 
would not take over the regulation 
of health insurance. State insurance 
departments would continue to license 
health insurers, oversee solvency, and 
enforce health insurance regulations, 
such as guaranteed-issue requirements, 
subject to federal minimum standards. 
However, as noted earlier, the exchange 
could reinforce certain requirements 
by excluding noncompliant carriers 
from participation. The exchange can 
also heighten the level of oversight 
and transparency of certain health 
insurance practices.
Is the exchange operated by the 
federal government or states? 
Assuming national health care reform, 
the exchange would be established 
under federal law and responsibility 
for operating it would ultimately 
reside with the federal government. In 
addition, if subsidies in the exchange 
were financed federally, the federal 
government would likely retain this 
function, as well. CBO has suggested 
that states have less incentive to control 
costs when administering federal 
subsidies.43 On the other hand, because 
local factors influence many aspects 
of health care and health insurance 
markets, states might be given the 
opportunity to establish and administer 
an exchange subject to federal 
guidelines. Whether states would 
want to take on this responsibility is 
an open question. A state might want 
to administer the exchange in order 
to provide even more protection 
for its residents than federal law 
provides—for example, to require 
policies to cover more than national 
minimum benefit standards specify. 
However, affording states this level of 
flexibility might also affect the overall 
cost of health reform, in this example, 
by increasing the cost of subsidizing 
health insurance premiums. 
Conclusion
A health insurance exchange makes it 
possible to organize health insurance 
markets more efficiently and effectively 
than takes place today for the many 
reasons outlined here. Because so many 
different problems must be addressed 
in the insurance marketplace in order 
for all Americans to have meaningful 
and affordable coverage, an entity like 
an exchange is needed to coordinate 
tasks and guide markets to comply with 
consumer protections and compete in 
cost-efficient ways. An exchange is not 
a panacea for all that ails the U.S. health 
care system, but, carefully designed, 
it can be a vehicle that facilitates and 
monitors the movement of the system 
toward achievement of many national 
health care reform goals. Without 
an exchange, a patchwork of new 
agencies and new roles for existing 
agencies at the federal and state levels 
would be required to achieve reform 
objectives, and in so doing, uniformity 
and efficiency of administration of the 
necessary tasks would be compromised.
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